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Excessive Delay In The Courts:
Toward A Continuance Policy
Relating To Counsel And Parties
Thomas 0. Gorman*
Delay in the administration of justice is a common cause of
complaint . . . A judge, without being arbitrary or forcing cases
unreasonably . . . may well endeavor . . . to enforce due diligence
in the dispatch of business before the court.'
TJHE MAXIM "JUSTICE DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED" is an expression
which is becoming all too meaningful in our courts today. Many
of the large metropolitan courts in this country are being strangled
by the ever-increasing backlog of cases.
A plethora of reasons is responsible for this backlog. One reason
was revealed in a study of the court system of the District of Colum-
bia:
The court of general sessions and the district court both
have rules which are designed to control and limit continu-
ances. Nevertheless, the granting of continuances appears to
be routine. For example, our review indicated that almost
50 percent of the major misdemeanor eases in the court of
general sessions were continued at least once after a trial
date had been set. The rate for civil eases was even higher;
a sample of daily calendars for 1967 and 1968 showed that
continuance on the jury trial date ranged from 35 to 70
percent while the nonjury range was 35 to 60 percent. In
the district court, continuance rates, while lower, were not
significantly better. Of the civil cases pretried in January,
1969, more than one-third were subsequently continued
before trial. On the criminal side, in the fall of 1968, approx-
imately 26 percent of the cases alerted for trial each week
were formally continued and numerous other cases were
trailed day to day waiting to go to trial.2
Such statistics obviously point to a situation in which much time
and expense is wasted-time which could be spent at trial. While
there appears to be no adequate study of the number of trial days
lost each year through liberal continuance policies, the statistics
cited above indicate that the figure is considerable.
*A.B., John Carroll University; third year student at Cleveland State University Col-
lege of Law. This paper was written under the auspices of the Court Management
Project of the Cleveland Bar Association, Cleveland, Ohio, funded by a grant under
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 from the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration through the Ohio Department of Community and Economic
Development.
1 ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, No. 18.
2 REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE To THE COMM. ON THE DISTR/cT
OF COLUMBIA, 91sT CONG., 2D Sass., COURT MANAGEMENT STUDY (Comm. Print 1970).
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1972
EXCESSIVE DELAY IN THE COURTS 119
In most court systems, continuance policies are either non-exis-
tent or couched in vague terms such as "good cause shown. ' 3 It is
the aim of this study to formulate guidelines for a sound continuance
policy which will serve to speed the administration of justice without
interfering with the high standard of judicial fairness necessary to
proper adjudication.
Court Powers to Deal With the Problem
The authority to develop a continuance policy is vested in the
courts since they have the
... inherent power to establish rules for regulating their
proceedings and for facilitating the administration of jus-
tice .... This power exists independently of statute, and its
exercise is especially to be commended at this time when
the constantly increasing volume of litigation necessitates
maximum efficiency in expediting courtwork lest justice be
delayed and thereby virtually denied 4
Indeed, the courts have the affirmative duty to provide each litigant
an opportunity to have his case adjudicated speedily.5
While it is true that the statutes and court rules of many juris-
dictions delineate specific grounds upon which motions may be
brought, all of these statutes and rules, in the final analysis, leave
the decision on the request to the sound discretion of the trial court.6
A court which grants motions on a routine basis abdicates its
responsibility by, in effect, permitting the trial bar to regulate the
flow of cases. The trial bar, in general, tends to be concerned only
with the status of individual cases and not with the entire backlog
of litigation, as is the court.7 This is not to suggest that the trial bar
does not have some responsibility for the flow of cases; as officers
of the court, they should request continuances only when absolutely
necessary.
The Continuance Rule: "Inherent Power of the Courts"
The inherent power of courts to regulate their own procedure
has spawned the continuance rule. The well-established rule of the
common law, which applies to both civil and criminal cases, states
8 See, the New Rules of the Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, (avail-
able from Clerk of Common Pleas Court, Cuyahoga County, Cleveland, Ohio 44113).
These rules are believed to be typical. They contain no reference to a continuance
policy.
4 Meyer v. Brinsky, 129 Ohio St. 371, 195 N.E. 702 (1935) ; see U.S. SuP. CT. R. 50;
an example of rules promulgated under this rule is seen in the Second Circuit Rules
Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases (1971).
a ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETics, No. 18.
8 AIz. Civ. R. 42(c); FLA. CPIM. R. 1.190(g) (2); HAWAII Rzv. STAT. Ch. 19 § 1909
(1968); ILL. PRAc. ACT & R., Sup. CT. R. 2B 1 (h); MIcH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 768.2
(1968); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 631.02 (1947) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 1520 (1942); Mo.
STAT. ANN. ch. 545 § 710 (Vernon's 1944); Mo. Sup. CT. R. 25.08 (a). One writer
has even suggested that a statute cannot grant an absolute right to a continuance.
Garner, Continuances in Akransas, 4 ARK. L.R. 449 (1950).
7 COURT MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra, note 2 at 66.
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that the issuance of a continuance is within the sound discretion of
the trial court, and the ruling of the trial court will not be disturbed
on appeal except for an abuse of discretion.8 Many courts have re-
stated the rule to the effect that a continuance shall be granted
where the ends of justice require it,9 or where the refusal of such
a request would substantially prejudice the rights of the movant.10
Nor may a continuance be refused to deny a litigant his day in court.1 1
Some courts state that continuances should be granted liberally,1 2
while other jurisdictions are more restrictive. 3
The granting or refusing of a continuance depends upon the
particular facts of the situation, and the grounds upon which a motion
may be predicated are limited only by the ingenuity of the parties
involved. 14 Where a court has no guidelines to follow, the inevitable
result is a mass of case law leading in all directions and allowing
little uniformity among or within jurisdictions.
Limitations on the Inherent Power of Courts
Generally, the only limitation on the inherent power of courts
to grant continuances is the abuse of discretion rule invoked by ap-
pellate courts on review.
Although there are many grounds, statutory and other-
wise, upon which a continuance may be sought, an analysis
of the decisions discloses that in most of the cases in which
the requested relief has been denied, reviewing courts have
been unable to find an abuse of discretion under the par-
ticular circumstances and accordingly have refused to
reverse the judgment of the trial court for its refusal to
grant a continuance.15
The power of trial courts to issue a continuance is thus extremely
broad, and appellate courts in most instances are reluctant to inter-
fere with the trial court's ruling.
Case law is limited only to those instances where some ques-
tion arose concerning the trial court's discretion. Other than the
8 Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940);
Isaacs v. United States, 159 U.S. 487 (1895) ; see Akron v. Public Util. Comm'n,
5 Ohio St.2d 237, 215 N.E.2d 366 (1966), cert denied 385 U.S. 828 (1966) ; State
ex rel Buck v. McCabe, 140 Ohio St. 535, 45 N.E.2d 763 (1942) ; Norton v. Norton,
111 Ohio St. 262, 145 N.E. 253 (1924) ; Hoff v. Fisher, 26 Ohio St. 7 (1874) ; Loeff-
ner v. State, 10 Ohio St. 598 (1857). Note that the principle is equally well estab-
lished in every other jurisdiction, and is often cited without authority. These cases
are selected as representative only.
9 Brown v. Air Pollution Control Board, 27 Ill.2d 450, 227 N.E.2d 754 (1967); Orsi
v. Young, 112 Ill. App.2d 360, 251 N.E.2d 309 (1969); Kehrer v. Kehrer, 28 11.
App.2d 296, 171 N.E.2d 239 (1960).
10 Burford v. Stuart, 422 P.2d 428 (S. Ct. Okla. 1967).
n Lindsey v. Escude, 189 So.2d 465 (La. Ct. App. 1966).
12 Dean v. Carter, 131 Mont. 304, 309 P.2d 1032 (1957).
13 Cleeland v. Cleeland, 249 N.C. 16, 105 S.E.2d 114 (1958) ; see Jankelson v. Cisel,
3 Wash. App. 137, 473 P.2d 202 (1970).
14 McCasky, The Matter of Continuances, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 106 (1957).
15 3 OHIO JUR. 2d Jppellate Re-view § 756 (1953) ; COURT MAJACEMENT STUDY, iupra,
note 2 at 66.
Sept. 1972
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1972
EXCESSIVE DELAY IN THE COURTS
District of Columbia study, no reliable data is available to determine
the percentage of continuance requests granted as a matter of course.
Nevertheless, it may be fairly stated that most continuance requests
are routinely granted,'6 and that only where such requests are arbi-
trarily or capriciously denied will an appeal be taken and the case
reported. Thus, the abuse of discretion rule may be an ineffective
curb on liberal continuance policies.
While the abuse of discretion rule forms one limitation on the
issuance of continuances, procedural due process forms another. A
complete discussion of the litigant's right to a fair and impartial
opportunity to be heard is beyond the scope of this paper. However,
it is appropriate to comment on this topic briefly, for it is frequently
mentioned as a consideration in the granting or refusing of a motion
for a continuance, and is often an underlying consideration in other
cases.'
7
Two aspects of procedural due process are frequently mentioned
in cases, and will be briefly discussed. First is the right in civil cases
to notification of the suit. In criminal cases this is the right to noti-
fication of the charges against the accused. Second, and as a corollary
to this rule, is the opportunity to be heard. This applies in both
civil and criminal cases.
In civil actions, one of the essential elements of procedural due
process is the right to notification.' s This is a right of creditors, for
example, to notification when the bankruptcy court acquires original
jurisdiction; 19 or to an opposing party when a substantial amendment
to any pleading is filed.20 Such notice must be reasonable and ade-
quate for the purpose and the nature of the proceedings, and suitable
to the character of the rights which may be affected by it.21 In
civil cases, notification of the suit must be given a sufficient length
of time prior to the hearing in order to afford the other party the
opportunity to be present.22
In criminal cases, the defendant is entitled to an indictment or
information which states the specific charges against him.23 "No
principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than
that of notice of the specific charge . . .124 All that is constitution-
ally required of such an indictment or information is that it be
16 Jankelson v. Cisel, 3 Wash. App. 137, 473 P.2d 202 (1970).
1 See Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964) ; Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444
(1940) ; Isaacs v. United States, 159 U.S. 487 (1895).
Is Anderson Nat'l. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944).
19 Hanover Nat'l. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
20 Laing v. Rigney, 160 U.S. 531 (1896).
21 Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); see Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362,
369 (1930) ; Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 409 (1900).
22 Id.
23 Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948).
24 Id. at 201.
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valid on its face and specifically state the charges.2 5 Such a process
effectively informs the accused of the charges against him.
The second element of procedural due process affecting con-
tinuance policy is the right to be heard. In civil cases, this is con-
strued as a right to an opportunity to be heard whenever it is neces-
sary for the protection of the parties. 26 This is not an absolute right.
Reasonable limitations, fairly imposed to expedite justice, and not
prejudicial to the rights of the parties, are not only tolerated, but
demanded by due process.27 Unnecessary delay may result in loss
of this right.2 8
Similar principles apply in criminal cases. The filing of an in-
formation or an indictment from the grand jury is all that is neces-
sary under clearly established principles of procedural due process
to grant the accused ". . . a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues
raised by the charge, if desired ..."29 (emphasis added). As demon-
strated by the court in the Cole case, this is a right which may be
knowingly and intelligently waived, or which may be lost through
unnecessary delay. The right also impliedly includes a reasonable
opportunity to prepare3 0
Procedural due process also provides protection against arbitrary
action by the trial court.31 Such a determination is necessarily de-
pendent upon the facts in each case. In Powell v. Alabama, the court
held that the trial court's failure to give the defendant reasonable
time and opportunity to secure counsel violated due process."2
Grounds for Continuances
Because of the many reasons for which a continuance may be
requested, it is apparent that no one general rule can or should be
formulated to cover the exigencies of every situation. At best, recom-
mendations toward a continuance policy can only be based on some
of the more frequent reasons for requested continuances. Accord-
ingly, the grounds which will be discussed are limited to those which
relate to attorneys and to parties.
Absence of Counsel
Withdrawal or Discharge of Counsel
Civil Cases
One of the frequent grounds upon which a motion for a con-
tinuance is predicated is that of withdrawal or discharge of counsel.
25 Id.; see also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956), rehearing denied, 351
U.s. 904 (1956).
28 Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U.S. 51, 58 (1902).
27 State ex rel Buck v. McCabe, 140 Ohio St. 535, 45 N.E.2d 763 (1942).
28 See Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948).
29 Id.
80 DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947).
31 Washington ex rel Oregon R.R. & Navig. Co. v. Fairchild, 224. U.S. 510 (1912);
see Reynolds v. Cochran, 365 U.S. 525 (1961).
s2 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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In civil cases, it has been stated that this does not give the litigant
an absolute right to a continuance.3 3 To obtain a continuance as a
matter of right under such circumstances would result in unnecessary
delay, since a litigant desiring delay would be free to discharge his
attorney at any stage of the proceedings. 34 The overruling of a motion
in such circumstances does not deny the litigant his day in court,
nor does it violate the procedural due process right to counsel.
35
Many factors are weighed by the courts when considering a
request for a continuance on the basis of withdrawal or discharge
of counsel. Paramount among the factors considered in these cases,
as in all requests for a continuance, is the element of good faith.
Counsel should never bring a motion for a continuance purely as a
delaying tactic, and if he does, the court should deny it. Another
factor to be considered by the court is the length of time available
to the moving party between the date of counsel's withdrawal or
discharge, and the trial, to enable movant to obtain new counsel and
to properly prepare the case without delay. Other factors to be con-
sidered include adequate notice of the trial date and availability
of associate counsel in lieu of chief counsel.
The first requirement is that of good faith. The right to be repre-
sented by counsel in a civil case contemplates the allowance of a
reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel. 36 However, if a litigant does
not exercise that right, or chooses to exercise it in such a way that
it will retard the administration of justice, he may be forced to pro-
ceed to trial without counsel.3 7 The clear import of such holdings
is that an element of good faith must always be present when re-
questing a continuance on the grounds of withdrawal or discharge of
counsel. Thus, in a case in which a party dismissed his attorney just
prior to the trial because of dissatisfaction with him, and it appeared
that the case had been pending for several years, the motion was
denied for lack of good faith.3 8 Similarly, in a Minnesota case in
which the attorney was discharged under suspicious circumstances
during the course of the trial, the motion was also properly denied.3 9
The time at which the attorney withdraws is also a determinative
factor. For example, where an attorney withdrew in April and the
case did not come to trial until September, the court in Roberts v.
McDanie 40 denied the motion, stating that
33 in re Dargie's Estate, 33 Cal. App.2d 148, 91 P.2d 126 (1939).
34 Grunewald v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 331 F.2d 983 (8th Cir. 1964); Berger v.
Mantle, 18 Cal. App.2d 245, 63 P.2d 335 (1936) ; Brunson v. Hamilton Ridge Lumber
Corp., 122 S.C. 436, 135 S.E. 624 (1932) ; Peterson v. Crockett, 158 Wash. 631, 291
P. 721 (1930).
s In re Dargie's Estate, 33 Cal. App.2d 148, 91 P.2d 126 (1939).
" Wykoff v. Winisky, 9 Mich. App. 662, 158 N.W.2d 55 (1968).
37 Id.
38 National Am. Banks v. Bankers Int'l Ins. Co., 386 F.2d 216 (3rd Cir. 1967).
39 Kothe v. Tysdale, 233 Minn. 163, 46 N.W.2d 233 (1951) ; see Benson v. Benson, 66
Nev. 74, 204 P.2d 316 (1949), where the court held that it was the defendant's fault
that he was without counsel.
40 Roberts v. McDaniel, 22 Iil. App.2d 485, 161 N.E.2d 47 (1959).
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. . giving the party the right to select counsel of his
own choice emphasizes a responsibility upon him to select
counsel who will diligently represent him and who will pre-
pare for trial without unnecessary delay.
41
A continuance has also been denied where attorneys withdrew at
various times prior to trial: three weeks,42 two weeks (for non-pay-
ment of fees), 43 nine days,4 4 and six days. 45 In all of these cases, the
court found in denying the motion that there was adequate time to
secure other representation.
Denial has even been upheld in a case where the party diligently
attempted to obtain new counsel but failed to do so. In Maynard
v. Bolers46 counsel withdrew before notice of the trial date and appel-
lant subsequently contacted eight firms, all of which refused to rep-
resent him. He finally obtained counsel, but only after the trial date
had been set. The attorney agreed to represent him only if a continu-
ance could be secured. The court, in denying the motion, stated:
Where a party has had actual knowledge that his case
is set for trial for a certain time and appears at that time, he
is not entitled to a continuance in the absence of a showing
that he has not had such knowledge long enough to enable
him to properly prepare ... the fact that eight attorneys had
refused to represent him is not grounds for a continuance at
the trial.47
It is frequently stated in these cases that failure to employ counsel
until just prior to trial is insufficient grounds,48 since the party has
had ample notice of the time of the trial.49 Where there are two
attorneys and one withdraws, and the motion requests additional
time for the substitute counsel to prepare, courts have held that the
party has already had adequate time. 0
In Evans v. Scottsdale Plumbing Co.,51 the court specified in its
order that an attorney would not be allowed to withdraw until his
client had executed a stipulation stating that such withdrawal would
not delay the trial. Subsequent to counsel's withdrawal, when a con-
uance was requested to obtain new representation, the motion was
denied on the basis of the stipulation. Such a procedure may serve
as a useful example for other courts when counsel wishes to withdraw
or is discharged.
41 Id. at 490, 161 N.E.2d at 50.
42 Houser v. Frank, 186 Kan. 455, 350 P.2d 801 (1960).
43 Harms v. Simkin, 322 S.W.2d 930 (St. Louis Ct. App. 1959).
44 Slaughter v. Zimman, 105 Cal. App.2d 623, 234 P.2d 94- (1951).
45 Stern Equip. Co. v. Porte]], 116 A.2d 601 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1955).
46 Maynard v. Bolers, 99 Cal. App.2d 805, 222 P.2d 685 (1950).
47 Id. at 686.
48 Miller v. Grier S. Johnson, Inc., 191 Va. 768, 62 S.E.2d 870 (1951).
49 McFaddin v. Oakwood Realty Co., 139 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
50 Luse v. Waco Commun. School Dist., 258 Iowa 1087, 141 N.W.2d 607 (1966).
51 Evans v. Scottsdale Plbg. Co., 10 Ariz. App. 184, 457 P.2d 724 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Evanr].
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Only where the trial court has clearly abused its discretion will
a denial of a continuance be reversed. An analysis of the cases shows
that the denial of a continuance by the trial court where counsel has
withdrawn or has been discharged has been sustained on appeal in
approximately three of every four cases.5 2 However, where the re-
fusal of the trial court is reversed, the general reason cited is that
representation by counsel is a basic right and the trial court should
allow a reasonable time for preparation.5" An example of this rule
is seen in a Texas case where an attorney withdrew on the day
before trial, and thirty minutes prior to the trial new counsel was
obtained. On appeal, the trial court's refusal to grant the continuance
was reversed.
5 4
In Lowe v. Arlington,5 5 the attorney withdrew seventeen hours
prior to trial and the court, in reversing the trial court's refusal to
continue, stated that:
a . . a fundamental element of due process is adequate
and reasonable notice appropriate to the nature of the hear-
ing. Such notice involves a reasonable time to prepare.
58
However, this reasoning has been rejected by the same courts, where
substitute counsel was involved,57 (see the sub-section on Docket Con-
flicts, infra). To justify reversal, the courts require that it be shown
that these continuances were not requested for purposes of delay,
and that the withdrawal or discharge of counsel was not collusive
to obtain delay.5"
Reversal of the trial court's refusal to grant continuances seldom
occurs. As pointed out, the general rule is that the decision of the
trial court to deny the continuance will not be disturbed absent a
showing of abuse of discretion. Where a motion which has been denied
by the trial court is reversed on appeal, it is usually because the trial
court permitted the attorney to withdraw.
Perhaps the best rule which can be formulated for the with-
drawal or discharge of counsel is suggested by the Evans case, supra.
Such a rule would permit counsel to withdraw or permit a party to
discharge counsel only upon execution of a stipulation to the effect
that the case will not be delayed. Once the stipulation is executed,
52 48 A.L.R.2d 1155, 1159 (1956).
53 Griffin v. Russell, 161 Ky. 471, 170 S.W. 1192 (1914); Fidelity-Phoenix Fire Ins.
Co. v. Oliver, 25 Tenn. App. 114, 152 S.W.2d 254 (1914).
54 Leija v. Concha, 39 S.W.2d 948 :(Tex. Civ. App. 1931); accord, Smith v. Bryant,
264- N.C. 208, 141 S.E.2d 303 (1965) (Attorney withdrew for non-payment of fees).
55 Lowe v. Arlington, 453 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); accord, Finch v. Wal-
berg Dredging Co., 76 Idaho 246, 281 P.2d 136 (1953); Stefanov v. Ceips, 395
S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) ; see also, 48 A.L.R. 2d 1150 (1956).
56 Lowe v. Arlington, 453 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
57 Slaughter v. Zimman, 105 Cal. App.2d 623, 234- P.2d 94 (1951) ; Stern Equipment
Co. v. Portell, 116 A.2d 601 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1955); Houser v. Frank, 186
Kan. 455, 350 P.2d 801 (1960) ; Harms v. Simkin, 322 S.W.2d 930 (St. Louis Ct.
App. 1959).
59 Morimoto v. State, 47 Ariz. 314, 55 P.2d 806 (1936).
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no further delay will be allowed on the grounds that the party cannot
obtain counsel, provided the party has had adequate notification of
the trial date.
Criminal
In criminal cases the sixth amendment right to counsel is much
more zealously guarded and a defendant's lack of representation for
any reason may warrant automatic reversal.58 However, the decision
is still a function of the trial court's discretion, and the court still
scrutinizes the factors which lead to the request. The courts look to
the conduct of the defendant as it contributes to delay, and to the
diligence which the defendant exercises in attempting to replace
counsel, in order to determine his good faith.
It is clear that a defendant may not attempt to delay his trial
date by discharging his attorney shortly before trial and then request-
ing a continuance.60 Thus, in a case where the defendant had dis-
charged his court-appointed attorney and had obtained new counsel
on the eve of trial, a continuance for time to prepare was held
properly denied.61 Where the attorney who had been on the case for
five months was discharged two weeks prior to the trial, the motion
was also held to be properly denied.62
The courts frequently state in criminal cases that if the defen-
dant is at fault he cannot complain if he is without adequate repre-
sentation.63 This rule has been applied in cases where the attorney
attempted to withdraw because of non-payment of fees where he had
taken the case on the express stipulation that he be paid in advance,6 4
and where counsel withdrew seven days prior to trial with no
reason given.65
Time of withdrawal or discharge is a factor in cases in which
the defendant fails to act diligently in replacing counsel. In this
situation, the court will refuse to grant a continuance. Lack of dili-
gence is interpreted as willful delay. This rule has been invoked in
denying a continuance where the defendant had three weeks notice, 66
seven days notice,6 7 and six days notice68 to obtain new counsel. In
59 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
60 Holt v. United States, 267 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1959) ; cert. denied, 365 U.S. 838 (1961).
61 Mixon v. Commonwealth, 282 Ky. 25, 137 S.W.2d 710 (1940).
62 Harper v. United States, 143 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1944).
63 Stirling v. State, 38 Ariz. 120, 297 P. 871 (1931).
64 People v. Collins, 242 Cal. App.2d 626, 51 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1966).
65 Gathright v. State, 245 Ark. 840, 433 S.W.2d 433 (1968).
66 United States v. Redwitz, 328 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1964) ; accord, United States v.
Moore, 419 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1969) (one week) ; Ebsen v. State, 249 Ark. 477, 459
S.W.2d 548 (1971) (six months to prepare and party obtained counsel ten days
prior to trial) ; State v. Dickson, 198 Kan. 219, 424 P.2d 274 (1967) (obtained
counsel two days prior to trial); State v. Adamson, 197 Kan. 468, 419 P.2d 860
(1966) (ten days to prepare for trial).
67 Winegar v. State, 92 Okla. Crim. 139, 222 P.2d 170 (1950).
68 State v. Wilson, 139 Wash. 191, 246 P. 289 (1926).
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none of these cases did the defendant obtain new counsel until short-
ly before trial. These decisions are based on the theory that the de-
fendant had reasonable time to obtain new counsel, and that his lack
of diligence in obtaining new counsel was the principal cause of
the delay. In the absence of a showing of substantial prejudice to
defendant, no continuance will be granted.
69
In certain situations, the appellate courts have found an abuse
discretion on the part of the trial courts, amounting to reversible
error. In People v. Robinson,7" two defendants were represented by a
single attorney, and two weeks prior to trial one defendant demanded
another attorney after learning of a possible conflict of interest. The
other defendant, in jail, indigent, and unable to retain counsel, did
not know of the public defender's office. The only time he could
communicate with the court was at the start of the trial. The refusal
of a continuance to obtain representation was held tantamount to
a denial of the right to counsel, and the conviction was reversed.
Similarly, in Rice v. State,71 where the attorney withdrew on the eve
of trial and a continuance to obtain new counsel was refused, the
appellate court reversed on the grounds that the trial court had per-
mitted the attorney to withdraw and that it was thus an abuse of
discretion not to allow the defendant time to seek adequate counsel.
Reversal was also warranted where defense counsel failed to appear,7 2
and where counsel absconded with the defendant's funds. 73 In these
cases the defendant was found not to be at fault.
In habeas corpus proceedings, the District Court for the Northern
District of New York has held that the defendant had been denied
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel where defense counsel with-
drew at the trial because of friction with the judge, and the defen-
dant was unable to afford an attorney. A judge's offer of the services
of a legal aid attorney with only one hour to prepare a multiple in-
dictment case (an offer the defendant refused), and subsequent re-
fusal to grant a continuance, was held an abuse of discretion.74 It
was also held a violation of due process to refuse a continuance
where defendant's counsel withdrew at the trial and a court-appointed
attorney was given thirty minutes to prepare; in this case, it was
later demonstrated that had the defendant had enough time, he
could have produced a witness who would have vindicated him.7 5
60 Nash v. State, 248 Ark. 323, 451 S.W.2d 869 (1970).
70 People v. Robinson, 42 Cal.2d 741, 269 P.2d 6 (1954).
71 Rice v. State, 220 Ind. 523, 44 N.E.2d 829 (1942).
72 Chenault v. Commonwealth, 282 Ky. 453, 138 S.W.2d 969 (1940).
73 Blakeney v. State, 228 Miss. 162, 87 So.2d 472 (1956).
74 United States ex rel Davis v. McMann, 252 F. Supp. 539 (N.D.N.Y. 1966), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 958 (1967).
75 Merritt v. State, 219 A.2d 258 (Del. 1966) ; see also People v. Simpson, 31 Cal. App.
2d 267, 88 P.2d 175 (1939); Cash v. Culver, 120 So.2d 590 (Fla. 1960); People v.
Ritchie, 66 Ill. App.2d 417, 213 N.R.2d 306 (1966); Roberts v. Commonwealth, 339
S.W.2d 640 (Ky. 1960).
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In all of the cases where an abuse of discretion was found, the de-
fendant was also found not to be at fault, and the continuance was
found not to have been for the purpose of delay.
As in civil cases, the use of the stipulation for withdrawal or
discharge of counsel is recommended. Under this system, if counsel
is discharged or withdraws, a stipulation should be executed which
states that no continuance will be subsequently sought in order to
obtain counsel. Particularly in criminal cases, the court should not
permit withdrawal or discharge, even by stipulation, within two
weeks of the trial date. Many of the cases in which denial of con-
tinuance to obtain counsel was held an abuse turned on the point
that the court had permitted the attorney to withdraw shortly prior
to trial.
Docket Conflicts
Civil
Conflicts of docketing often cause one of the attorneys involved
in a case to seek a continuance on the basis that he is presently en-
gaged in another court. In considering a motion on this basis, courts
often refer to the right of a party to have a particular attorney, the
rights of the other party, sufficient notice of the trial date, and the
presence of associate or substitute counsel.
Generally, the retention of a lawyer who is required to be in
another court does not give the movant any right to a continuance.
Counsel is responsible for knowing when his case will come to trial,
and if he cannot be in attendance on that day, he should have other
counsel available to try the case.76 Thus, in civil cases, there is no
absolute right to a particular attorney--especially where the con-
tinuance is requested for purposes of delay. Trial date conflicts will
be considered adequate grounds only where the need for particular
counsel is demonstrated:
There may be circumstances under which a trial court
would be justified in delaying a trial by reason of conflicting
trial engagements of counsel, but it would require a showing of a
necessity for the presence of a particular counsel . . . before this
court would be justified in finding that the refusal to postpone
constituted an abuse of discretien. If a fixed rule were adopted
that, whenever counsel had conflicting trial engagements,
a continuance should be granted, it would render possible
such delays as would interfere with the administration of
justice. The disposition of the vast amount of litigation
pressed upon the attention of our courts cannot be subject
to such contingencies . . .77 (emphasis added)
75 Gregoire v. National Bank, 413 P.2d 27 (Alas. 1966) ; cert. denied, 385 U.S. 923
(1966); Northwestern Benev. & Mut. Aid Ass'n v. Prim, 19 Ill. App. 224 (1885),
aff'd 124- Ill. 100, 16 N.E. 98 (1888) ; Mann v. Terre Haute, 240 Ind. 245, 163
N.E.2d. 577 (1960).
77 Heinz v. Atlantic Stages, 113 N.J.L. 321, 174 A. 682 (1934); accord, Haight v.
Green, 19 Cal. 113 (1861).
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When a party has received adequate notice of the trial date, a
continuance request will be denied. Where a motion was made five
days prior to trial,7 8 on the day of trial,7 9 and even when the parties
have stipulated that a continuance should be granted,80 the motion
has been denied. Some courts state that the motion will be denied
where the movant knew of the trial date, presumably on the basis
that the movant is at fault and cannot thereafter be heard to com-
plain.81 Other courts state the question in terms of the rights of the
parties involved. 82 Such a view holds that the other party suffers
undue expense and vexation when a continuance is granted.8 3 It is
only in a very unusual case that an attorney should be permitted to
request a continuance for a conflict in another court.84
Some cases have turned upon the consideration that associate
counsel was present, and that the moving party was, therefore, ade-
quately represented and not entitled to a continuance. 85 This was
the result even where the other party consented to the continuance.
8 6
Some courts have even stated that it is the duty of the engaged attor-
ney to have an associate counsel ready to try the case.
87
In certain circumstances, denial of continuance for absence of
counsel due to an engagement in another court has been reversed
for abuse of discretion. In many of these cases, however, the court
based its decision on other circumstances, without which there might
have been a contrary result. Thus, where an attorney appeared as a
witness in another case,88 and where an attorney was himself the
defendant in another court,8 9 it was held an abuse to deny the motion.
In other cases, when a conflict resulted from a change in the time
of holding court sessions by the legislature,90 or when the case was
called out of order,91 the motion should have been granted. It has
also been held an abuse to deny the motion where the attorney was
78 Flynn v. Fisk, 60 Cal. App. 670, 213 P. 716 (1923).
70 Tiffin v. Cummings, 144 Cal. 612, 78 P. 23 (1904) ; Patton v. Evans, 92 Utah 524,
69 P.2d 969 (1937).
80 Daugherty v. Lanning-Harris Coal & Grain Co., 218 Mo. App. 187, 265 S.W.
866 (1924).
81 Davies v. Infragnio, 54 II1. App.2d 299, 203 N.E.2d 725 (1964) ; Stallard v. Wither-
spoon, 306 S.W.2d 299 (Ky. App. 1957).
s2 Birmingham v. Goolsby, 227 Ala. 421, 150 So. 322 (1933).
83 Adamek v. Piano Mfg. Co., 64 Minn. 304, 66 N.W. 981 (1896).
s4 Evansville & Ind. Ry. v. Hawkins, 111 Ind. 549, 13 N.E. 63 (1887).
85 Hopkins v. Smothers, 114- S.C. 448, 104 S.E. 30 (1920).
86 Moulden v. Kempff, 115 Ind. 459, 17 N.E. 906 (1888).
87 Northwest Benev. & Mut. Aid Ass'n v. Prim, 19 I1. App. 224 (1885).
88 Bayers v. McPhea, 4 Colo. 204 (1878); Maistrosky v. Harvey, 133 So.2d 103 (Fla.
App. 1961); Hambrick v. Stewart, 29 Ga. App. 220, 114 S.E. 723 (1922); Moulden
v. Kempff, 115 Ind. 459, 17 N.E. 906 (1888) ; Evansville & Ind. Ry. v. Hawkins, 111
Ind. 549, 13 N.E. 63 (1887) ; Martin v. Rossignol, 226 Md. 363, 174 A.2d 149 (1961) ;
Laumeler v. Laumeier, 308 Mo. 221, 271 S.W. 481 (1925); York v. Steward, 30
Mont. 363, 76 P. 755 (1904).
s9 Hill v. Clark, 51 Ga. 122 (1874).
0 Rossett v. Gardner, 3 W.Va. 531 (1869).
1 Watkins' Adm'r. v. Ahres & Ott Mfg. Co., 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 926, 38 S.W. 868 (1897).
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engaged in the Supreme Court9 2 and, generally, where there are ex-
treme circumstances.
Criminal
Continuances should be denied when the scheduling conflict is
the fault of the defendant. Nor is it a deprivation of due process to
deny a continuance requested because counsel is enagaged in another
court. 93 Some courts, in refusing to grant continuances, suggest that
the schedule conflict may be the defendant's fault.9 4
Similarly, where an attorney's caseload is so heavy that he is
unable to meet his trial obligations, the defendant may be penalized.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts expressed the general view in
Commonwealth v. Festo95 by stating:
. .. there is congestion in the dockets of the Superior Court.
No attorney can accept personal retainers for a larger number
of cases than he can try when they are reached, and expect
courts to continue any case for his convenience or that of his
clientsY6
Attorneys must be able to arrange their work load so as to be able
to handle the case load they accept.97
Care must be exercised when formulating a continuance policy
in the criminal area. To deny a request for a continuance in a crim-
inal case under any circumstances, because of absence of counsel,
is always subject to review as a violation of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of right to counsel. 98 The Supreme Court since Gideon,99
Escobedo,10 0 and Miranda,'0' has zealously guarded the criminal de-
fendant's right to counsel.
But the Sixth Amendment does not grant a license for arbitrary
interference with the judicial process:
To hold that a defendant charged with crime has an
absolute right to counsel of his own solicitation, with un-
limited right to insist upon continuances of his trial, and that
the court, jury, and witnesses must await the convenience of
his counsel in fulfilling oher engagements, would be subver-
sive of the prompt administration and execution of the laws
-upon which depends largely their effectiveness-and sub-
ject the time and service of citizens serving the State gratui-
tously, as jurors and witnesses, to the wishes and interests
92 Harde v. Purdy, 62 Misc. 232, 115 N.Y.S. 92 (Sup. Ct., App. Term 1909).
93 Id.; Feinberg v. People, 174 Ill. 609, 51 N.E. 798 (1898).
94 Griffin v. State, $5 Ga. 602, 69 S.E.2d 665 (1952); State v. DiBenedetto, £2 N.J.L.
168, 82 A. 521 (1912), affPd 83 N.J.L. 792, 85 A. 1135 (1912); accord, Gilmore v.
United States, 273 F.2d 79 (3rd Cir. 1959).
95 Commonwealth v. Festo, 251 Mass. 275, 146 N.E. 700 (1925).
96 Id., ,146 N.E. at 701.
97 Brickey v. State, 148 Ark. 595, 231 S.W. 549 (1921).
98 Tolbert v. United States, 55 A.2d 91 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1947).
99 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
100 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
101 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 890 (1966).
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of the attorney engaged in the defense. It is too apparent for
argument that the court below must, in the nature of things,
have some control over such matters.
1
'
0
To hold otherwise would subject the judicial process to unlimited
delays, whenever counsel or client felt them necessary for his case.
Such tactical delays are often sought by the defendant in an effort
to wear down the prosecution witnesses, who often become discour-
aged after several fruitless trips to the courthouse where continuance
after continuance is obtained by defendant's counsel. The end result
is that when a case finally comes to trial, the prosecution witnesses
fail to appear.103 The defendant thus obtains vindication by default,
not by justice. Such practices obviously add not only to the backlog
of cases, but also to a lack of respect on the part of the public for
our court system.
It is suggested that where counsel is engaged in another court,
substitution should be required, unless it can be shown that there
is a necessity for a particular counsel. Pre-trial conference agree-
ments as to trial date may eliminate many of the present scheduling
conflicts.
Disability or Death of Counsel
Civil
Generally, continuances requested on the grounds that an attor-
ney's absence was due to illness should be granted where there is
a showing that the disability was legitimate, that it occurred late
enough in the proceedings to preclude the appearance of substitute
counsel, that it is obviously not requested as a dilatory tactic, and
where it is made clear that counsel would be able to return to trial
work within a reasonable time.
Where an attorney appears in court and makes the motion him-
self, the trial court must determine from counsel's own testimony
and appearance the validity of the excuse and may, if it desires, issue
a continuance on its own motion.' 04 In one case, where defense coun-
sel became intoxicated at the trial, the judge adjourned the case
until the following morning and ordered the defendant to obtain
new counsel overnight and proceed at that time. Defendant appealed
the ruling on the grounds that he lacked adequate time to obtain
counsel. The ruling of the trial court was sustained, however, pre-
sumably because the defendant was at fault for retaining intemperate
counsel. 05
Continuances have been denied where associate counsel was
present, on the theory that the refusal to grant the motion did not
102 People v. Goldenson, 76 Cal. 328, 19 P. 161 (1888).
103 Letter from Samuel S. Herrup to the author, April 18, 1972; see The Appearance
Control Project in the New York City Criminal Court (1971, unpublished; available
from the author, c/o Cleveland State University).
104 Hawes v. Clark, 84 Cal. 272, 24 P. 116 (1890).
105 McAllister v. Ealy, 98 Okla. 223, 225 P. 146 (1924).
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violate the party's right to counsel.1 06 Continuances have also been
denied where it was the chief or leading counsel who was absent, 10 7
even where the associate stated that he was not prepared to try
the case.' 08 These courts take the position that as long as the party
is represented by (some) counsel, no continuance is necessary. 109
Generally, where a continuance is predicated on grounds of ill-
ness of counsel, a certified physician's statement must be attached
to the motion stating that counsel cannot physically attend trial,"10
that the illness is "sudden," and that counsel will, within a reasonable
time, be able to return to trial work."'
In these situations, the first question which the court is likely
to raise is the adequacy of notice to the defendant between the time
the illness occurred and the trial date. In one case, five days notice
has been held to be adequate notice to obtain new counsel, and not
"sudden"."i 2 The second question is whether or not due diligence
was exercised by defendant in obtaining new counsel.' 1 3 In this con-
nection, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that a continuance
was properly denied where it appeared that counsel had been ill all
summer, even though a physician's statement was submitted attesting
to the fact that counsel was too ill to appear in court. The motion was
denied because there was no showing of suddenness, and because the
party had had adequate time to obtain new representation after
learning of counsel's condition."14 A continuance was also denied in
a case in which the attorney would not have been availiable for two
to three months because of illness."15 Where counsel has died, the
court again looks to the question of suddenness and diligence" i6 and
sufficiency of notice of the trial date.
106 American Rubber Corp. v. Jolley, 260 Ala. 600, 72 So.2d 102 (1954); Missouri &
N. Ark. R.R. v. Robinson, 188 Ark. 334, 65 S.W.2d 546 (1953); Volkering v. Allen,
96 Cal. App.2d 804, 216 F.2d 552 (1950) ; Commercial Lumber Co. v. Ukiah Lumber
Mills, 94 Cal. App.2d 215, 210 P.2d 276 (194-9); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Hammond,
41 Colo. 323, 92 P. 686 (1907) ; Kurtzman v. Kurtzman, 339 Il. App. 431, 90 N.E.2d
245 (1950) ; Forked Deer Pants Co. v. Shipley, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 2299, 80 S.W. 476
(1904) ; Middaugh v. Chicago & N.W. R.R., 114 Neb. 438, 208 N.W. 139 (1950);
Early-Foster Co. v. El Campo Rice Milling Co., 212 S.W. 964 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
107 Missouri & N. Ark. R.R. v. Robinson, 188 Ark. 334, 65 S.W.2d 546 (1933) ; Middaugh
v. Chicago & N.W. R.R., 114 Neb. 438, 208 N.W. 139 (1926).
108 Commercial Lumber Co. v. Ukiah Lumber Mills, 94 Cal. App.2d 215, 210 P.2d 276
(1949) ; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 41 Colo. 323, 92 P. 686 (1907) ; Early-
Foster Co. v. El Campo Rice Milling Co., 212 S.W. 964 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
109 Wiedekind v. Toulumne County Water Co., 83 Cal. 198, 23 P. 311 (1890).
110 Smith v. Daniel, 46 F.2d 740 (6th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 852 (1931) ; Davis
v. Shengley, 88 Ohio App. 4-23, 100 N.E.2d 261 (1950); Texas Mexican Ry. v.
King, 132 S.W. 966 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910).
nl Thomas v. Toppins, 206 Cal. 18, 272 P. 1042 (1928) ; Matthews v. Matthews, 220
So.2d 246 (La. Ct. App. 1969).
112 Cudd v. State, 159 Okla. 87, 14 P.2d 406 (1932).
13 Condon v. Brockway, 157 11. 90, 41 N.E. 634 (1895).
Il Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Hardy, 144 Ark..190, 222 S.W. 12 (1920).
115 Jackson v. Jackson, 201 Okla. 292, 205 P.2d 297 (1949).
11 In re Weswall's Estate, 11 Ariz. App. 314, 464 P.2d 634 (1970); Ostro Inc. v. Boyd-
ston Bros., 323 Ill. App. 137, 54 N.E.2d 742 (1944); Crabtree Coal Mining Co. v.
Hambry's Adm'r., 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 687, 90 S.W. 226 (1906).
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In summary, a continuance based on counsel's illness should be
granted when a physician's certificate is submitted to the court which
states that it would endanger counsel's health to attend court, that
the illness is sudden, and that counsel will be able to return to trial
work within a reasonable time. Conversely, if there is associate
counsel present, the continuance should be denied unless it can be
demonstrated that there is a necessity for the presence of particular
counsel.
Criminal
A continuance was considered properly denied in a criminal case
when the trial court judge rejected the attorney's contention that
he was too ill to proceed." 7 The trial court may also refuse to grant
a continuance where there is conflicting medical testimony.118 How-
ever, where the illness is sudden and deprives the party of represen-
tation, the motion should be granted.119
Despite the effect of the Sixth Amendment on criminal cases, if
associate counsel is present and capable of representing the defendant,
a continuance may properly be denied.120 However, where an affi-
davit was submitted to the court to the effect that leading counsel
was ill and that junior counsel was incompetent to try the case,
denial of a continuance was held an abuse.12' Denial in such a case
would have effectively left the defendant without representation.
A few courts have attempted to appoint counsel for the defendant
in such situations, and on appeal this was approved where it was
shown that the defendant was not thereby injured. 22 In such cir-
cumstances, if the defendant is not at fault and the motion is brought
in good faith, due process demands that reasonable time be allowed
substitute counsel to prepare.
It is recommended that continuances be allowed only when coun-
sel presents a physician's certificate that the illness was sudden and
when he assures the court that he will be available for trial work
within a reasonable time.
11T United States v. Prujansky, 415 F.2d 1045 (6th Cir. 1969) ; Middleton v. State, 396
Ga. App. 697, 148 S.E. 304 (1929).
118 State v. Blakeney, 164 La. 669, 114 So. 588 (1927).
119 People v. Crovedi, 65 Cal.2d 199, 53 Cal. Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868 (1966) ; Allen v.
State, 10 Ga. 85 (1851) ; State v. Zellers, 7 N.J.L. 220 (1824); Wyatt v. State, 410
P.2d 86 (Okla. Crim. 1965).
120 United States v. Moore, 419 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1969) ; Morris v. United States, 7
F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 640 (1925); Hopkins v. State, 52
Fla. 39, 42 So. 52 (1906); Wright v. State, 184 Ga. 62, 190 S.E. 662 (1930) ; Roth
v. State, 70 Ga. App. 93, 27 S.E.2d 473 (1943) People v. Davis, 406 Ill. 215, 92
N.E.2d 649 (1950); Roberts v. State, 188 Ind. 713, 124 N.E. 750 (1919) ; Tolliver
v. Commonwealth, 165 Ky. 312, 176 S.W. 1190 (1915) ; State v. Davis, 203 N.C. 13,
164 S.E. 737 (1932), tert. denied, 287 U.S. 649 (1932); State v. Lytehfield, 230 S.C.
405, 95 S.E.2d 857 (1957).
122 Johnson v. Commonwealth, 119 S.W. 745 (Ky. App. 1909).
122 Curry v. State, 17 Ga. App. 377, 87 S.E. 685 (1915); Reid v. State, 14 Okla. Crim.
651, 174 P. 800 (1918).
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Absence of Parties
Civil
When the absence of a party is predicated as a ground for a con-
tinuance, the usual reason is illness or unavailability of the party.
In this connection, the issue usually is whether or not the presence
of the party is required at the trial.
In civil cases, some courts hold that the party is already present
through counsel, 123 and accordingly, his presence is not necessary.
To sustain the motion, then, it generally must be shown that the party
is a material witness in the case.124 Thus, if the party is the only one
who knows where the necessary witnesses and information are located,
the continuance should be granted.125 In support of the motion, coun-
sel must aver to what matters the party would testify at the trial,1 26
and establish that other witnesses could not testify to the same
matters. 27 If other witnesses can testify to the same material, the
continuance will be denied.128 Following this rule, it has been held
that the mere allegation that a party is necessary,' 29 or that the party
is needed to confer with counsel, are not sufficient grounds."1 0 The
right of a party in a civil trial to be present is not absolute,131 and
it must appear that counsel cannot adequately proceed to trial with-
out the presence of the party. 32
Due diligence, however, must also be exercised to secure the
attendance of the party.133 There must be a showing that a denial
would work actual prejudice to the moving party before a continu-
ance should be granted on such grounds, 3 4 and due diligence must
be shown.' 35 If the party voluntarily absents himself, no continuance
should be granted.136
Even in cases where the party is shown to be a material witness,
an attempt must be made to obtain the testimony of the party by
123 Nomes v. Edsall, 18 F. Cas. 296 (No. 10290) (C.C.D.N.J. 1843).
124 Ex parte Driver, 258 Ala. 233, 62 So.2d 241 (1952) ; Brown v. Geib, 94- Okla. 270,
221 P. 1006 (1923) ; Benson v. Madden, 206 Or. 427, 293 P.2d 733 (1956).
135 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Taylor, 52 Cal. App. 307, 198 P. 651 (1921).
126 Lerner v. Bluestein, 175 S.C. 59, 179 S.E. 265 (1934).
127 Obion County v. Houser, 9 Tenn. App. 646 (1929).
128 Spadoni v. Maggenti, 121 Cal. App. 147, 8 P.2d 874 (1932).
229 Merryman v. Sears, 50 Ariz. 412, 72 P.2d 943 (1937) ; Paulucci v. Verity, 1 Kan.
App. 121, 40 P. 927 (1895).
130 King v. McWhorter, 174 Miss. 187, 163 So. 679 (1935).
131 Gorman v. Sabo, 210 Md. 155, 122 A.2d 475 (1956) Jennings Co. v. Dyer, 41 Okla.
468, 139 P. 250 (1914).
132 Martin v. Nichols, 121 Ga. 506, 49 S.E. 613 (1904) ; Morse v. Lowe, 111 Ga. 274,
36 S.E. 688 (1900); Mosley v. Bridges, 65 Ga. App. 64, 15 S.E.2d 260 (1941)
McCurry v. Cunningham, 21 Ga. App. 546, 94 S.E. 914 (1918).
133 McGrath v. Tallent, 7 Utah 256, 26 P. 574 (1891).
134 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Etheridge, 132 S.C. 488, 129 S.E. 428 (1925); Barns v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 110 S.C. 259, 96 S.E. 530 (1918).
335 Vevelstad v. Flynn, 230 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 827 (1956).
136 Ballard v. Nye, 18 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1927).
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other means.137 Note, however, that this requirement is vitiated if
the illness is sudden and there is no time to take a deposition."38 If
a deposition by the party is available, the continuance may still be
denied.139 In a case where a party was ill and the court granted coun-
sel time to obtain a deposition, a later motion for a continuance to
take a deposition was properly denied since it could not be demon-
strated that the party was too ill to submit to the taking of the deposi-
tion.140 In federal court, the motion was also held properly denied
where the party was ill, the trial court noting that a deposition could
still have been secured. 141
Likewise, where the testimony could have been obtained by
stipulation, 42 or admission, '43 the continuance was held properly
denied. Some states specifically make the granting 4  of an admission
grounds for refusal of a continuance in their statutes and court
rules.145 A continuance has also been held properly denied where an
affidavit of the absent party had already been introduced into evi-
dence.146
It thus becomes apparent that when a party who is a material
witness is absent involuntarily, and his testimony cannot be obtained
by deposition or other method, the continuance should be granted.
If the party is voluntarily absent, or his testimony could have been
obtained by other means, the continuance should not be granted.
Criminal
In criminal cases, the right of the defendant to be present at his
own trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment right of confronta-
tion, and the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
127 Engelstad v. Dufresne, 116 F. 582 (9th Cir. 1902).
138 Roberts v. Sinkey, 136 Kan. 292, 15 P.2d 427 (1932).
130 Davis v. United Fruit Co., 402 F.2d 328 (2nd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1085
(1969); Gordan v. Butter, 182 Neb. 626, 156 N.W.2d 778 (1968); Merriman v.
Lary, 205 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), rehearing denied, (1947) ; Kaiser v.
Hutcheson, 112 S.W.2d 1058 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
140 Roseberg v. Scott, 120 Kan. 576, 244 P. 1063 (1926).
141 Ballard v. Nye, 18 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1927).
"I' Kitchens v. Hutchins, 44 Ga. 620 (1872).
143 See Haflin v. United States, 223 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1955), rev'd. on other grounds,
358 U.S. 415 (1959); Brooks v. Bast, 242 Md. 350, 219 A.2d 84 (1966) ; Powell v.
State, 39 Ala. App. 246, 100 So.2d 38, cert. denied, 267 Ala. 100, 100 So.2d 46 (1957)
Moody v. Vickers, 79 Ohio App. 210, 72 N.E.2d 280 (1947).
144 An admission in this matter refers to a statutory procedure which takes place as
follows: When the movant requests a continuance because of an absent witness, he
submits an affidavit stating to what that witness will testify; if the opposing party
admits the witness would so testify the affidavit is introduced into evidence as a
deposition and the continuance denied. See note 145 infra.
145 ARK. STAT. ANN. ch. 27, § 1403 (1947) ; CODE OF GA. ANN. § 81-1411 (1935) ; IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 10-109 (1948); ILL. PRAC. ACT & Sup. CT. R. 231(b); INn. STAT.
ANN § 9-1401 (1971 Burns); Ky. Civ. R. 43.03; LA. CODE OF Ciy. P. art. 710; Miss.
CODE ANN. § 2522 (1942); MO. STAT. ANN. § 510:110 (1942 Vernon); N. M. STAT.
ANN. § 21-8-11 (1953) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 17.050 (1971) ; S. D. COMP. LAWS § 15-11-9
(1967).
146 Lewis v. Bartley, 300 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1962) ; Skinner v. Lundy, 149 F.Supp. 57
(W. D. Ky. 1957).
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ments. The usual grounds for a continuance in criminal cases is ill-
ness of the defendant, and we shall confine our discussion to this
point.
Generally, in order to obtain a continuance on this ground, the
defendant must show by a physician's certificate that to go t6 trial
would cause undue interference with his health; i.e., that he is not phy-
sically able to attend trial. Where this showing is made, a continuance
should be granted.14 7 However, where the trial judge can physically
observe the defendant, he may refuse to grant the motion and proceed
with the trial, regardless of a physician's certificate to the contrary.148
Thus in State v. Storm,149 even though a physician stated that the
defendant had a pulse of 105, a temperature of 100% degrees, and
respiration of 22, and recommended that that he stay in bed, the
trial judge, after observing the defendant, refused to grant the con-
tinuance and his action was sustained by the court of appeals. Sim-
ilarly, where a physician's statement contended that the defendant
was suffering from a chronic epididymitis and prostatitis and was
nervous and exhausted, the appellate court found no abuse in denying
the continuance, since the trial judge personally observed the de-
fendant.150
Even without observation of the defendant, the continuance may
be denied if the facts as presented in the certificate are found insuffi-
cient. In a recent Illinois case, where the defendant had a 97 degree
temperature and 100 pulse, and the physician certified that the de-
fendant was not physically able to go to trial, the court properly
refused to grant a continuance, stating that there was insufficient
evidence.' 5 ' And in a case in which a physician stated that it would
endanger the defendant's life to go to trial, the motion was also held
properly denied, presumably because the defendant was not even
bedridden.152
In cases where the defendant has voluntarily incurred the dis-
ability, the continuance should be denied.15s Voluntary disability
should never be a ground for granting a continuance.
147 Shaneyfelt v. State, 4-0 Ala. App. 13, 109 So.2d 14-6 (1959), aff'd, 263 Ala. 520, 109
So.2d 149 (1958) ; accord, Reid v. State, 478 P.2d 988 (Okla. Crim. 1971).
148 Martin v. State, 194 Ark. 711, 109 S.W.2d 676 (1937) ; Rowland v. State, 125 Ga.
792, 54 S.E. 694 (1906); Warren v. State, 53 Ga. App. 221, 185 S.E. 385 (1936)
State v. Starr, 24 N.M. 180, 173 P.674 (1918), appeal dismisred, 254 U.S. 611 (1920)
State v. Pierce, 175 Wash. 523, 27 P.2d 1087 (1933).
14 24 N. M. 180, 173 P. 674 (1918); appeal dismissed, 254 U.S. 611 (1920).
150 Commonwealth v. Hanley, 337 Mass. 384, 149 N.E.2d 608 (1958), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 350 (1959).
151 People v. Halfee, 354- Ill. 123, 188 N.E. 186 (1933).
152 Fuller v. State, 40 Ala. App. 297, 115 So.2d 110 (1958), cert. denied, 269 Ala. 657,
115 So.2d 118 (1959); accord, Young v. Commonwealth, 271 Ky. 65, 111 S.W.2d
433 (1937); State v. Dean, 163 S.C. 213, 161 S.E. 449 (1931) ; State v. Lee, 58 S.C.
335, 36 S.E. 706 (1900) ; Kelly v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. 156, 138 S.W.2d 1075 (1940).
153 Russell v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966); Bourne v. State,
103 Miss. 628, 60 So. 724 (1912).
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The foregoing cases suggest that in the criminal area, a continu-
ance should be granted for absence of a party only where the dis-
ability is involuntary, and a physician's certificate attests to the fact
that to go to trial would endanger the defendant's health. Where the
trial judge can personally observe the defendant, the certificate may
be disregarded if the judge finds that the defendant can stand trial.
Conclusions and Recommendations
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that no one rule
could or should be formulated to cover all situations which may give
rise to a motion for a continuance. Thus, several suggestions are
offered to cover the situations discussed. Methods of implementing
these policies are also discussed.
Counsel
In the case of withdrawal or discharge of counsel, the good faith
of the moving party is of paramount importance. When counsel
wishes to withdraw or is discharged from a civil suit, his client should
be required to execute a stipulation to the effect that no further
delays will be requested on this ground.
In criminal cases, the use of the stipulation is also recommended.
However, because the right to counsel is strenuously safeguarded,
it is recommended that no withdrawal or discharge be permitted
within two weeks prior to the trial date. A change occurring two
weeks or more before the trial would allow the defendant sufficient
time to obtain other representation to prepare the case.
In the area of docket conflicts, it is recommended that adequate
notice of the trial date be agreed upon by the parties at the pre-
trial hearing. This will allow counsel to arrange their schedules so
as to eliminate conflicts.
Since there is no right to a particular attorney, except in unusual
instances, it is recommended that in civil cases the matter be brought
to trial regardless of conflict. Where a party is left without counsel,
substitute counsel must be used, or the party should be forced to trial
without counsel. Such a procedure has been instituted in the Common
Pleas Court of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, very successfully. 5 4 While
such sanctions appear to be harsh, they prove to be seldom invoked.
Charles H. Starrett, Jr., Administrator of the Pittsburgh Court of
Common Pleas, stated:
. .. because of the effect upon a lawyer's reputation and the
effect of such activity on his malpractice insurance, the trial
bar has quickly learned to avoid situations which would
require the court to invoke such a sanction.155
154 Letter from Silvestri Silvestri, Judge, Corn. P1. Ct., Allegheny County, to Samuel
J. Roberts, Justice of the Supreme Ct. of Pa., May 1, 1972.
155 Letter from Charles H. Starrett, Jr. to Steven J. Madson, May 25, 1972. See Budget
Laundry Co. v. Munter, No. 2362 (Allegheny County Common Pleas, Pa., April,
1970).
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In criminal cases, adequate notice of the trial date should help
to eliminate many conflicts. However, because the right to counsel
is more stringently safeguarded in criminal cases, a rule such as that
recommended for civil cases is inappropriate. Where the defendant
is left without representation, it is suggested that substitute counsel
be appointed by the court, if possible, and that a reasonable amount
of time be given for trial preparation. In order to encourage members
of the trial bar to be present at trial, it is suggested that where coun-
sel fails to appear, appropriate sanctions be imposed for contempt.
Where illness of counsel is the basis of the motion, and the attor-
ney is before the court, it is apparent that the court should exercise
its discretion. In both civil and criminal cases, if associate counsel is
present, the motion should be denied.
Where counsel is not before the court in a civil action, a physi-
cian's certificate should be required. This certificate should state that
the illness is one which would render it dangerous to counsel's health
to attend court, that the illness was sudden, and that counsel will be
able to return to trial work within a reasonable time. If any of these
requisites is not met, the motion should be denied. In situations
where the requirements are not met and counsel is not present, ap-
propriate sanctions on counsel should be levied.
In criminal cases, the same procedure is recommended. If the
defendant is left without counsel, substitute counsel should be ap-
pointed, again with a reasonable amount of time given to new coun-
sel to prepare his case.
Parties
When a party is absent from trial in a civil case, it must be
shown that the party is a material witness to the case. In addition,
it must be shown that no other witness can testify to the same matters
and that the information could not be obtained by deposition, stipu-
lation, admission, or other means. If these requirements are not met,
no continuance should be granted. Voluntary absence should never
be considered as a basis for a continuance.
In criminal cases, voluntary absence is not a valid basis for a
continuance. Since the usual basis of a request in criminal cases is
illness of the party, it is recommended that where the defendant is
before the court, the court exercise its discretion. Where the defen-
dant is not before the court, a physician's certificate should be sub-
mitted which states that it would be dangerous for the defendant to
attend trial.
Implementation
Many of the rules suggested above contemplate adequate notice
of the date on which the trial will begin. To effectively implement
these rules, it is recommended that the following procedures be
utilized.
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As soon as possible after an answer is filed in a civil case, a pre-
trial conference should be conducted. At this conference, two objec-
tives should be accomplished. First, the issues should be narrowed
and resolved, if possible. If settlement is not possible, the court
should either assign the case to arbitration or set a tentative trial date.
Approximately three weeks prior to trial, a "settlement confer-
ence" should be held.150 At this conference, all efforts should be
expended to conclude the case. If this is not possible, then a firm trial
date should be fixed by the court with the consent of counsel. 157 By
utilizing such a procedure, two results are contemplated. First, the
settlement of cases "on the courthouse steps" or during voir dire
would be reduced. When parties refuse to settle until this time,
the court is put to undue expense and loss of time. However, when
one party deems a continuance necessary at this point, and the op-
posing party can show that a continuance would operate to his econ-
omic detriment, the court may, in its discretion, require the movant
to post a bond or pay the opposing party's costs as a condition of
granting the continuance. 5 8
It is also cortemplated that by setting a firm trial date at the
settlement conference, many of the docketing conflicts which now
exist may be eliminated. Many courts presently schedule two or more
cases for the same day. 159 Such policies often result in counsel's not
knowing whether a case will actually be tried on a particular date.
This inevitably leads to docket conflits. By agreeing to a firm trial
date at the settlement conference, counsel knows exactly when the
case will come to trial. Thus, the court would be warranted in denying
a continuance requested for a docket conflict which arises at a later
date.
Although critics of such a policy may suggest that a second pre-
trial hearing will serve only to further clog the docket, this may not
be the result, since one function of the pre-trial conference is the
settlement of many cases which might otherwise go to trial. The
addition of a settlement conference, combined with the possible
sanctions on counsel, should aid in the settlement of cases prior to
trial. The settlement conference also provides a medium for working
out a trial date which is agreeable to all, thus eliminating many
docketing conflicts.
156 See, The Superior Court of Los Angeles, California, Policy Memorandum for the
Conduct of Trial Setting, Pretrial, and Settlement Conferences (1971).
157 This type of procedure for setting trial date has been successfully used in arbitra-
tion. See A Manual for Accident Claims Arbitrators, ACCIDENT CLAIMS ARBITRATION,
at 139 (1970).
158 For a case where costs are used as a condition for granting a continuance, see
Gentry v. Lakey, 276 N.E.2d 857 (Ind. App. 1971) where the trial court awarded
$100 costs to the plaintiff for a continuance granted to the defendant. On appeal,
this ruling was held to be within the trial court's discretion.
15 New rules of the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, supra note 3.
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In criminal cases, similar procedures are recommended. Any
negotiation of the plea should take place at the pre-trial conference,
and a firm trial date should be set by the court with the advice of
counsel at that time. A later conference is not then deemed necessary.
It is contemplated that these recommendations can be imple-
mented under most calendaring systems, including the personal
docket system. In that system, each judge has a thorough knowledge
of the case before him, since he has dealt with it through the various
stages of litigation. Thus the problems of docket conflicts, or the use
of depositions for absent witnesses, can effectively be solved at the
pre-trial level by the judge who will try the case. At trial, the judge
will then know when a continuance is necessary.
These recommendations represent only a start toward the devel-
opment of a rational continuance policy. These suggestions will not in
themselves remedy the massive backlog of cases in the courts, but
are offered only as a beginning of the retreat from the quagmire of
cases presently strangling the courts.
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